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Arguments for Nonparental Care for Children 
 
“It takes a village to raise a child” (African proverb) 
 “Only those who do not work do not make mistakes” (Romanian proverb) 
 
The value of nonparental childcare is a widely debated issue. Although in 
many contemporary societies most children are exposed to some nonpar-
ental care carried out either in various institutions or by nannies, friends, 
and extended families, people disagree about its benefits—especially for 
preschool children—and few believe there is a duty to ensure that all 
children are exposed to it. The law usually allows parents to exclude 
children of preschool age from nonparental care, and where homeschool-
ing is allowed, nonparental care can be avoided for much longer. Here, I 
criticize the still widespread conviction that there is nothing wrong in 
confining childcare to parents. Moreover, I argue that there is a duty to 
ensure that care for all children older than one be shared between parents 
and people who come into children’s lives as strangers but who are pre-
pared and willing to develop caring relationships with them. By “par-
ents” I mean the primary figures in children’s lives, those who take the 
moral and legal responsibility for caring continuously for children until 
they reach maturity.1 By “nonparental care” I mean care given by people 
who are not the parents of the children for whom they care but who may 
be other children’s parents. 
 I outline three arguments already present in the literature on childcare 
and then introduce five more arguments that discuss the value of expos-
ing all children older than one to some nonparental care. To the best of 
my knowledge, with the exception of argument 5, the arguments dis-
cussed in section 4 have not been formulated as such before.2 
                                                          
 1The parents may be biological or not, single or partnered, married (to each other) or 
not, gay or heterosexual; I do not discuss how different types of family may impact on 
childrearing. The only assumption I make is that children need to have at least one adult 
committed to providing continuous care and thus serving as a primary figure, and that 
societies should ensure that this need is met. 
 2Arguments 4, 7, and 8 rely on feminist work on the various ways in which child-
carers can fail to give adequate care. While many of the cited authors would support 
nonparental care (as a universally available, if not mandatory, institution), they have not 




 Some of the arguments are based on the well-being of children and/or 
parents, others on fairness (towards children and/or parents, and towards 
mothers) and some on both well-being and fairness. Argument 6 con-
cludes that nonparental childcare is a matter of duty towards children, 
resulting from their dependence on caregivers. While some of the argu-
ments show that nonparental care is highly desirable, others have the 
more radical implication that excluding children from nonparental care is 
morally wrong, with the ultimate conclusion being that parents do not 
have the right to exclude their children from nonparental care. Although 
there are different grounds for the different arguments I discuss—well-
being, fairness, and duty—I hope that, taken together, they support each 
other in making the case for a system of universal, compulsory, and 
state-regulated childcare similar to the existing system of universal com-
pulsory education. I refer to this as “universal nonparental care.” 
 Although much of my argument rests on the importance of fairness 
towards children, on the endemic nature of mistakes in care and on chil-
dren’s vulnerability to failed care, I shall not consider the more radical 
possibilities of addressing these issues by either abolishing the family 
and raising children in well-run orphanages or by instituting a parenting 
license scheme.3 Instead, I start from the assumption that parenting as we 
know it4 is valuable and worth preserving, as long as parents do not do 
all the childcare. 
                                                                                                                                  
elaborated on the connection between inadequate care and the importance of nonparental 
care. Robert Goodin, on whose theory of vulnerability I ground argument 6, has written 
about family relationships and childrearing. See, for example, Protecting the Vulnerable 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), and “Responsibilities for Children’s Well-
Being,” in Sue Richardson and Margot Prior (eds.), The Well-Being of Australia’s 
Children (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2005), pp. 60-82. However, Goodin 
has not applied his argument concerning unacceptable monopolies in order to show that 
parent-child relationships involve a morally objectionable form of vulnerability unless 
nonparental carers are regular and robust suppliers of childcare.  
 3For a discussion of the first solution, see Véronique Munoz-Dardé, “Is the Family to 
be Abolished Then?” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 37-56. I think 
children’s need for a continuous and highly personalized bond of care and the importance 
adults place on parenting rule out the universal orphanage option. The parent licensing 
scheme has been advocated by Hugh LaFollette, “Licensing Parents,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 9 (1980): 182-97, and widely—and sympathetically—explored by Harry 
Adams in his Justice for Children: Autonomy, Development and the State (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2008). I believe the intrusion into people’s privacy 
involved in a licensing scheme would be exceedingly damaging to individual freedom 
and to interpersonal relationships. For convincing criticism, see Daniel Engster, “The 
Place of Parenting within a Liberal Theory of Justice: The Private Parenting Model, 
Parental Licenses, or Public Parental Support?” Social Theory and Practice 36 (2010): 
233-62. 
 4That is, a practice that involves one or several adults being the main caregivers of 
their children, whom they have come to parent sometimes intentionally and sometimes by 
accident. 
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 The effects of nonparental care, and especially of institutional care,5 
on children have an important bearing on their overall desirability. It is 
difficult to assess the evidence, not only because some the available data 
are contradictory (and often research on childcare is ideologically 
driven), but also because much of the existing institutional childcare is 
deficient and thus adequate empirical evidence is very difficult to gather. 
These difficulties aside, after a thorough assessment of the literature on 
childcare in the U.S., Jane Waldfogel has recently concluded that while 
nonparental childcare during their first year might be harmful to children, 
nonparental care of children after their first year appears to be neutral or 
even beneficial.6 Obviously, nonparental care must meet certain minimal 
criteria. Based on recent research on the effects of institutional childcare, 
Daniel Engster concludes that it “generally appears that nonparental 
childcare arrangements are not harmful for most children as long as they 
meet various quality measures including low adult-child ratios, adequate 
levels of caregiver training, staff stability, and decent physical facili-
ties.”7 
 Since I make a generic case for nonparental care, I do not specify de-
tails such as the best ratio of parental to nonparental care. The precise 
content of desirable nonparental care will vary with children’s individual 
needs, which are partially determined by age. In practice, exposing all 
children older than one to some nonparental care could mean, for exam-
ple, that they spend a few hours every day in childcare institutions. Non-
parental care can take the form of day care for infants, kindergartens for 




1. Nonparental Care and Justice 
 
The discussion of universal nonparental care involves three distinct, yet 
very closely related, questions. Only the first of these—about the value 
of nonparental care—is fully addressed in this article. The other two 
questions are: Should nonparental care necessarily be provided by pro-
fessionally trained people and, if so, should it be provided in state-
                                                          
 5Many societies have histories of particularly bad institutional care. In these cases, 
people have the understandable perception that care given in institutional settings is 
necessarily inferior to family care and often unacceptably bad. See Kathleen Lynch, John 
Baker, and Maureen Lyons (eds.), Affective Equality: Love, Care and Injustice (London: 
Palgrave, 2009). 
 6See Jane Waldfogel, What Children Need (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006). I am grateful to Daniel Engster for drawing my attention to this book. 
 7See Daniel Engster, The Heart of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
p. 214. 




regulated institutions or in private settings? and, Who should bear its 
costs: parents, society, or a combination of both? While I cannot engage 
at length with the last two questions, some of the arguments I discuss 
suggest that nonparental care should be provided by professional care-
givers in state-regulated institutions. 
 In the context of establishing whether justice requires universal non-
parental care, the more difficult question is whether the costs of childcare 
should be at least partly borne by society. There are several reasons why 
all the members of society should share the burdens of raising children8 
but they are highly disputed,9 and it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
make the case in favor of this position. For those not convinced that jus-
tice requires us to share the costs of childcare, arguments 3, 7, and 8 will 
be arguments about parental well-being rather than arguments concern-
ing fairness towards parents. Most arguments will, however, be unaf-
fected by the answer to the question whether childless people should bear 
the costs of nonparental care. State-regulated childcare institutions, or 
other forms of organized nonparental care, could be funded by parents 
only, for example, through a tax not payable by childless people. In this 
paper, I remain agnostic on this issue, but I point out its relevance for 
particular arguments.  
 I assume there are several, sometimes divergent, considerations that 
determine what is, overall, just; these include fairness, needs, rights, du-
ties, and utility.10 The relevant considerations for judging that universal 
nonparental care is just that I discuss here are children’s and parents’ 
needs, fairness, and a general duty to protect children from unacceptable 
forms of dependency. I believe that, taken together, these arguments 
show that parents do not have the moral right to exclude their children 
from nonparental care. 
                                                          
 8There are several reasons why the costs of childrearing should be (at least) to some 
extent socialized. Engster (The Heart of Justice) takes the fact that we, as children, have 
all appealed to other people’s care to be a ground for a universal duty of care towards 
whoever needs it, including (other people’s) children. In her book Valuing Children: 
Rethinking the Economics of the Family (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2008), Nancy Folbre argues that parents and nonparents should share the costs of 
childrearing because children are akin to “public goods”—having children is necessary 
for social survival. I engage later in this article with Ann Alstott’s argument that since 
raising children is such a resource-intensive activity in terms of time, money, and 
emotional involvement, it is unfair that parents should shoulder these costs alone. 
 9For example, Ingrid Robeyns has criticized the public goods argument in her review 
of Folbre’s book in Feminist Economics 15 (2009): 116-20. Even if one accepts the 
premise that children are (akin to) public goods, it is not clear that this entails the 
socialization of childrearing costs. See, for instance, Paula Casal and Andrew Williams, 
“Equality of Resources and Procreative Justice,” in Justin E. Burley (ed.), Dworkin and 
His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 150-69. 
 10The list is controversial, as are the relationships between the concepts on the list. 
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 All the reasons I discuss in section 4 indicate that nonparental care 
advances the well-being of both children and parents by meeting some of 
their needs. This claim would not, on its own, make the case that nonpar-
ental care is required by justice, given the widely accepted belief that 
parents are free to decide what is best for themselves and, with qualifica-
tions, for their children. This is particularly true when nonparental care is 
one of several possibilities available to meet particular needs, as in some 
of the cases I discuss. A second consideration, prominent in the present 
article, is fairness: different arguments show that nonparental care would 
advance fairness towards children, and towards parents (and mothers in 
particular). The fairness towards parents/mothers claim depends, how-
ever, on how one answers the above question about sharing the costs of 
childcare. Fairness towards parents alone would not mean that nonparen-
tal care should be universal and mandatory—since parents may waive 
their claim to fair treatment—but rather that it should be easily available 
to all children, possibly at general expense. 
 Therefore, the most important of the fairness-based arguments is that 
fairness requires us to spread the risk, and limit the damage, that failed 
care entails for children. If true, this is a strong reason to ensure that all 
children receive some nonparental care. In spite of the importance we 
place on fairness, however, sometimes we think that what is fair does not 
always coincide with what is just. In the case of childcare, some individ-
ual prerogatives, such as parental rights, might limit the pursuit of fair-
ness. To meet this objection, I advance an additional argument: I argue 
that children’s dependence on their caregivers and the inherently asym-
metrical and unequal relationships between children and caregivers gen-
erate a duty to diversify caregivers. Even if all parents were able to pro-
vide sufficient care, we would still have a duty to expose all children to 
some nonparental care as a way of avoiding monopolies of care and lim-
iting children’s vulnerability to any of their caregivers. I conclude that 
parental rights should be limited by a general duty to ensure that children 
do not depend too much on anybody’s hands-on care. 
 Being required by justice, universal nonparental care is, as such, 
mandatory. Implementation should, however, proceed very carefully. 
Societies vary widely in their ability to provide adequate nonparental 
care for all children,11 and in the levels of parental opposition to nonpar-
ental care. It is possible that, in some cases, making nonparental care 
mandatory may do more damage than good, since care provided in in-
adequate conditions can harm children. When the organization of univer-
sal, adequate nonparental care is unfeasible due to lack of resources, 
                                                          
 11Including children with special needs, for whom adequate nonparental care might 
involve much higher expense. 




finding the necessary resources should become a political priority. When 
parental opposition to mandatory nonparental care risks introducing 
harmful disruptions into children’s lives, we should not simply accept 
this opposition but try to persuade parents. For this reason, it is important 
that arguments showing that nonparental care is a matter of fairness and 
duty be accompanied by arguments showing that it advances children’s 
and parents’ well-being. 
 In my paper, some of these arguments are based on children’s and 
parents’ needs. A fundamental normative assumption I make is that fair 
societies ensure that everybody’s essential needs are met. Moreover, 
when the satisfaction of needs impacts on people’s (often comparative) 
opportunities to lead good lives, need and fairness point in the same di-
rection, providing all the more reason to ensure that needs are properly 
addressed. 
 Children are dependent on adults’ care if their needs for security, 
nourishment, hygiene, affection, socialization, and basic education are to 
be met. Since it shapes their bodies, personalities, and various abilities, 
the care they receive is crucial in determining their opportunities, both as 
children and as future adults. Parents, in turn, have their own needs 
(some of which qua parents), which means they should also be cared for; 
but, as adults, they are less dependent than children on particular indi-
viduals. A salient need of parents, which is seriously frustrated when 
childcare cannot be shared, is for time. Parents need some time free from 
the responsibility of caring for children if they are to have proper rest and 
the opportunity to pursue any other projects of their own.12 Equally im-
portant, parents (as well as children) need the responsibility for childcare 
to be divided among several persons in order to better manage the am-
bivalent feelings that permeate ordinary parent-child relationships.13 
 The issue of caring for children is central to gender fairness, since 
most of the work of care is still carried out by women. I agree with the 
vast feminist literature that explains why this is unfair to women and 
possibly bad for all involved (that is, for all members of society). The 
claim defended here, that some childcare should be done by nonparents, 
is backed by reasons of gender fairness. Feminists have long argued that 
care work should be shared between women and men. One obvious way 
to achieve this is through a redistribution of care work between mothers 
                                                          
 12This point has been made, and philosophically explored, by Anne Alstott, No Exit: 
What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
 13I work with the assumption that both children and parents experience ambivalent 
feelings towards each other—which is a widely accepted thesis, based on clinical 
experience, in object-relation theory. By ambivalence I mean that the love that binds 
most parents and children is inevitably accompanied by anger, frustration, and 
occasionally even hatred. 
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and fathers, a proposal to which I am fully sympathetic. However, where 
attempts to encourage fathers (through regulated paternal leave, for in-
stance) to participate in more hands-on care for their children are rela-
tively unsuccessful, institutional care is an alternative context in which 
men can be encouraged to carry out some of the childcare.14 It is likely 
that childcare will attract more men who are inclined to care for children 
(but who do not have the proper incentives to do so under the current 
social organization of care) if social norms require that some of it would 
be provided in adequate institutions, that it would be given a higher 
status than it currently has, and its quality would be acknowledged as a 
matter of common responsibility.15 
 Because the social organization of care is deeply gendered, the con-
flicts between the needs of children and those of caregivers often take the 
form of conflicts between children’s and mothers’ needs. Since the well-
being of mothers and that of children are so deeply intertwined, it is 
tempting to ignore these conflicts, conflate children’s and mothers’ 
needs, and perhaps retreat into an idealized—and ideological—
representation of selfless motherhood. The idealization of motherhood, 
often encountered in popular culture and even in mainstream psychother-
apy,16 obliterates those needs and interests of mothers that do not serve 
children’s own interests. I hope to avoid this idealization without falling 
for the complementary one, namely, the presupposition that whatever 
advances mothers’ needs should necessarily serve children’s interests. 
Instead, I assume that a fair society will seek institutional arrangements 
that minimize rather than exacerbate the conflict between moth-
ers’/parents’ and children’s needs, even if this is expensive. Suppose, for 
example, that a society without adequate institutional care were to 
sharpen the conflicts between mothers’/parents’ needs to pursue their 
                                                          
 14This would of course not resolve the issues of gender justice within individual 
heterosexual couples. But if it is true that some sources of widespread sexist attitudes 
reside in children’s lack of experience of caring men, then institutional care provided by 
men who are presumably qualified and willing to care will go some way towards a more 
gender-fair society. See, for instance, Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psycho-
analysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 
 15Research on childcare work and gender suggests that low pay is the main 
disincentive for men to seek and retain employment as childcare workers, especially 
given an enduring expectation that men be the primary breadwinners. See Claire 
Cameron and Peter Moss, “Literature Review since 1990 on Job Satisfaction, Quality and 
Aspects of Diversity in the Care Workforce. National Report—U.K.” (London: Institute 
of Education, University of London, 2002). This suggests that raising the status of 
institutional childcare is likely to attract more men than it currently does. 
 16For this claim, see the critical analysis recently offered by feminist psychoanalyst 
Rozsika Parker, in Torn in Two: The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence (London: 
Virago, 2005), and Wendy Hollway, in The Capacity to Care: Gender and Ethical 
Subjectivity (New York: Routledge, 2006). 




professional life and children’s needs for care. Also suppose that orga-
nizing institutional childcare of an adequate standard was a more expen-
sive option than leaving it entirely up to individual families. I assume 
that, other things being equal, fairness is a reason to choose the institu-
tional arrangement that is more expensive but which makes it more likely 
that neither mothers’/parents’ nor children’s needs will be extensively 
sacrificed.17 This last claim might be unconvincing for those who believe 
that it is fair that parents support the full cost of childrearing; but the 




2. Existing Arguments for Nonparental Care 
 
The recent literature on social equality, family and gender offers several, 
not always fully explicit, reasons for part of the childcare being provided 
by nonparents. To my knowledge these reasons have not yet been pre-
sented together in a systematic argument. Common to all these ap-
proaches is a relatively unproblematic perspective on quality of care is-
sues. They assume parental care is essential if children are to develop 
into autonomous, properly socialized adults who can form and pursue 
life plans of their own; care is thus (akin to) a primary good. These ap-
proaches, however, do not make much of the fact that care can, and often 
does, go wrong—and do not draw any conclusions about the best way to 
distribute care as a result of this fact.18 
 
(Argument 1) Leveling the field 
 
The fact that children grow up in families poses a serious challenge to 
fairness: families are sites of very unequal distributions of important 
goods such as education and socialization. Not only do children share 
their parents’ material condition, but they also spontaneously inherit 
much of their parents’ way of speaking the language, and their interests 
in various pursuits, habits, and social relationships. Class, power, social 
                                                          
 17I can see two different reasons for this. A general reason is that in a just society 
everyone’s basic needs will be taken into consideration (and needs for work and pursuing 
individual projects, as well as needs for care, are indeed basic). A second, special, reason 
is that mothers’/parents’ needs are not as independent from those of their children as are 
the needs of unrelated adults. Thus, there seems to be a special kind of moral harm in 
social arrangements that antagonize the needs of mothers/parents and children if 
alternative arrangements are available: when this happens, frustrating the needs of each 
party involves frustrating the needs of the other party as well. 
 18By contrast, the original arguments I offer in favor of nonparental care draw on the 
fact that care can easily fail. There are of course many other reasons why nonparental 
care is beneficial, as some of the readers of this paper have pointed out. 
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status, and education are being passed on from one generation to the next 
within families.19 Even in the absence of crass social inequalities, par-
ents’ freedom to raise their children according to their own values, which 
is recognized and protected by liberal regimes, means that parents’ im-
pact on their children’s well-being and future opportunities is very sig-
nificant.20 
 While there are good reasons for protecting this freedom (albeit in a 
qualified form), there is also a strong case for providing some nonparen-
tal childcare in order to level the playing field and mitigate, if not elimi-
nate, some of the above-mentioned inequalities. Barbara Bergmann, for 
instance, has argued that if some care takes place outside the family, in 
daycare centers, kindergartens, and schools, children are given the 
chance to catch up on whatever they might miss at home in terms of edu-
cation, social relations, and exposure to various values and lifestyles.21 
The more egalitarian these institutions are, the better they will counter-
balance home-inherited inequalities. For a variety of empirical reasons,22 
one can assume that publicly funded, state-regulated institutions are more 
likely to be egalitarian than market-run caring arrangements. This does 
not necessarily mean that the costs of childrearing must be shared be-
tween parents and childless people, since the necessary public funds may 
come from taxes paid only by parents. 
 On this account, universal nonparental care would rectify, or prevent 
the accumulation of, pre-existing unfair inequalities. This argument pro-
vides less reason for nonparental care in an already egalitarian society.23 
                                                          
 19For an early illustration of this point, which is now widely acknowledged, see 
James Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity and the Family (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1983). 
 20Various permissible actions that are part of the everyday lives of parents and 
children, such as reading bedtime stories, can accumulate into competitive advantage. See 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family,” Ethics 
117 (2006): 80-108, and “Legitimate Parental Partiality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 
(2009): 43-80.  
 21Barbara Bergmann, Saving Our Children from Poverty: What the U.S. Can Learn 
from France (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996). 
 22If childcare is organized in private, rather than public, institutions, it is more likely 
that parents will be able to use economic advantage to buy better care for their children, 
thus defeating the purpose of institutionalized care as a means of advancing a more 
egalitarian society. 
 23As Adam Swift (How Not to Be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally 
Perplexed Parent (New York: Routledge, 2003)) and Brighouse and Swift (“Parents’ 
Rights and the Value of the Family”; “Legitimate Parental Partiality”) argue, much of the 
parental care that results in social and economic opportunities for children consists of 
inconspicuous, everyday actions, such as reading bedtime stories to one’s child. Even in 
an egalitarian society people will presumably have different ways of parenting, leading to 
unequal opportunities for their children. Because choosing particular lifestyles that 
parents share with their children has intrinsic, and significant, value (Brighouse and 




It is important to be aware of the risk that particular arrangements of 
nonparental care might perpetuate, or exacerbate, various social divi-
sions, including class and economic ones (in a similar way to that in 
which public schools have been criticized for doing so). This is more 
likely if parents are allowed to choose the institution their child will at-
tend, or if children attend local care institutions in class-segregated 
neighborhoods. If such obstacles are not insuperable, the conclusion of 
this argument is that fairness towards children demands the provision of 
universal nonparental care. 
 
(Argument 2) Making the no-exit commitment lighter 
 
A second, somewhat symmetrical, argument based on distributive justice 
takes parents’ well-being and opportunities as grounds for the provision 
of some care outside the home. Parents’ commitment to care for their 
children inevitably involves serious costs in terms of time, economic op-
portunities, and personal autonomy. Anne Alstott argues that when they 
decide to parent, people make a “no exit” commitment (i.e., a commit-
ment from which one cannot and should not depart lightly) to give sig-
nificant weight to their children’s interests, often putting them before 
their own interests, and indeed to shape their own lives such that their 
children’s lives go well. Children’s need for continuity in care means this 
commitment extends over many years, hence it represents a very impor-
tant opportunity cost to parents. This cost can be high enough to endan-
ger parents’ autonomy. 
 Furthermore, having children is no longer in modern societies a 
source of economic benefit or an insurance that one will be cared for 
when ill or old. Thus parents’ commitment to their children is nowadays 
more demanding than it has ever been, because it involves high costs and 
no material benefits. According to Alstott, while it is fair that parents 
shoulder much of the cost of rearing their children—since they have 
freely decided to parent—it is also fair that parents be given social sup-
port to offset some of the cost of their commitment and to protect their 
autonomy. Alstott suggests the introduction of a caretaker resource ac-
count for parents in the form of money to be used for childcare and par-
ents’ own education or retirement.24 
 Although Alstott herself does not propose this, ensuring that all par-
                                                                                                                                  
Swift, “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family”), we would not want to eliminate all 
such differences. Thus we would have reason to organize some institutional care to offset 
the inequality-inducing effects of the family, even in an egalitarian society. 
 24The caretaker resource accounts advocated by Alstott in No Exit would be funded 
through taxation of both parents and nonparents, thus redistributing some of the economic 
costs of childrearing between the two groups. But people who decide to parent will 
continue to support much of the cost of parenting themselves. 
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ents have access to childcare would reduce the burden of the no-exit 
commitment, by redistributing to parents one of the resources they are 
often most short of—time.25 In this case, childcare would have to be 
funded through universal taxation, since its aim is to redistribute some of 
the costs of childcare from parents to the wider society. Thus, depending 
on the answer to the question of who should support the costs of child-
care, this is either an argument based on fairness towards parents or, at 
least, an argument concluding that universal childcare would be condu-
cive to parents’ well-being by meeting their need for time. 
 According to the no-exit argument, nonparental care is merely one of 
the several alternative ways in which parental commitment could and 
should be made lighter. Thus it is not strictly speaking an argument for 
nonparental care. The assumption that parental commitment should be 
made lighter—whether as a matter of fairness or, at least, to advance the 
well-being of parents by meeting some of their needs qua parents—will 
also play a role in the last two arguments discussed in this paper. I will 
argue that nonparental care is the only way of reducing the burden of 
guilt that often comes with parenting. 
 
(Argument 3) Advancing gender justice 
 
A third reason for having some nonparental care is grounded in gender 
fairness. In all societies, mothers bear the costs of childrearing dispropor-
tionately, forsaking career opportunities, education, and personal devel-
opment to a much larger extent than men.26 Women often miss out on 
opportunities because they are constantly occupied with most of the 
hands-on care for their children due to a combination of lack of choice 
and an ideology of the ever-present mother. If all childcare is to be pro-
vided by parents, then at least one of the parents must forsake the oppor-
tunity to work full-time. Given the current structure of the labor market, 
working part-time comes with significant penalties in terms of income, 
benefits, intrinsic quality of work,27 and, very significantly, in terms of 
future prospects for good jobs and financial security in case of divorce. 
In practice, it is largely mothers who work part-time in order to raise 
                                                          
 25She does not exclude it either; indeed, her book ends with the remark that there is 
much more that social policy could and should do to advance justice for parents by 
redistributing resources. 
 26See Nancy Fraser, “After the Family Wage,” Political Theory 22 (1994): 591-618; 
Janet C. Gornik and Marcia K. Meyers, Families that Work: Policies of Reconciling 
Parenthood and Employment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003); and Alstott, 
No Exit. 
 27Thus working part-time often makes it less likely that one will be assigned 
interesting, challenging, and intrinsically rewarding tasks, or that one will have the same 
degree of autonomy and control over one’s work as full-time workers. 




children. If provisions were made for parents regularly to leave their 
children in the adequate care of other people, they would have better op-
portunities to organize their work and family life in gender-egalitarian 
ways.28 
 Moreover, shifting some care work away from mothers, especially if 
this takes the form of professional care that involves men as well as 
women, will give care more social recognition. Since caring has been 
traditionally considered a female occupation, this will in turn improve 
women’s social standing—assuming that the majority of care work will 
continue to be done by women.29 If the nonparental care is provided in 
well-resourced institutions, the recognition gains for the caring occupa-
tions will arguably be even more significant. 
 This argument appeals to gender fairness: it shows that nonparental 
care is required because it rectifies (a) the disproportionate way in which 
mothers miss opportunities, and (b) the low social recognition attached to 
caregiving as women’s work. 
 Both the first and the third arguments presuppose pre-existing forms 
of unfairness and are thus vulnerable to the objection that it would be 
better to eliminate unfairness directly rather than mitigate its conse-
quences through nonparental childcare.30 In the rest of this paper, I show 
that there remain reasons of fairness (as well as other reasons) for having 




3. Inevitable Failings of Care 
 
Childcare can and very often does fail, regardless of who the caregiver is. 
Here I look at how easily care fails and at consequences of bad care. The 
otherwise rich literature on a feminist ethics of care has so far provided 
little exploration of the issue of bad care.31 Some theorizing of bad care 
is negative—one can deduce it from what different authors have to say 
about good care. 
                                                          
 28See, for example, Bergmann, Saving Our Children from Poverty. 
 29See ibid., and Fraser, “After the Family Wage.” 
 30I thank John Baker for drawing my attention to this point.  
 31Some exceptions are Ann Dillon, “The Ethical Education of Self-Talk,” in Michael 
S. Katz, Nel Noddings, and Kenneth A. Strike (eds.), Justice and Caring: The Search for 
Common Ground in Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999); and Nel 
Noddings, Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002). I discuss the many forms and causes of failed care and how they 
impact on children’s well-being and opportunities in Anca Gheaus, “How do Theories of 
Care Challenge Ideal Theories of Distributive Justice?” in Lisa Tessman (ed.), Feminist 
Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2009), pp.105-19. 
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 Sara Ruddick identifies three aims that parents should pursue: the 
physical preservation of children, fostering their psychological develop-
ment, and promoting their socialization.32 This means that when parents 
do not manage to keep their children safe, or to help their personal de-
velopment and ensure proper socialization, they are not giving suffi-
ciently good care. In order to achieve all the goals of such care, one 
needs a favorable constellation of external circumstances and individual 
abilities. External circumstances include parents’ material resources, 
their social status, and the institutional set-up of the caregiver’s society, 
as well as cultural norms and expectations, which can put pressure on 
caregivers to prevent children’s development if such development is so-
cially unacceptable.33 But even in ideal conditions, conflicts may develop 
between the different aims of care.34 Since in all societies many (perhaps 
most) parents struggle with precarious conditions, parenting is often 
likely to fall short of the standards of sufficiently good care. 
 Regarding the individual abilities needed to ensure good care, Joan 
Tronto thinks that a good caregiver has to be attentive to the cared-for, 
responsible for her or his well-being, competent in addressing needs, and 
responsive to the other person’s needs.35 It follows that inattentiveness, 
inability to take responsibility for the child’s well-being, or inability to 
properly address the child’s needs, as well as not being responsive 
enough to a child, will all count as failings of care. When extreme, such 
failings take the form of serious negligence and abuse, and constitute 
grounds for removing children from their parents’ custody and, when 
possible, placing them in other people’s continuous care. But most such 
failings are not extreme—they are very human, indeed everyday, failings 
to which we are all susceptible, rather than easily avoidable mistakes. 
There is no reason to believe that most other caregivers could avoid 
                                                          
 32Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1989). 
 33An extreme example is foot-binding in China, but less dramatic examples can be 
found in contemporary Western societies. For instance, most societies have gender 
expectations that make it unacceptable for boys to be as emotional as girls and for girls to 
be as assertive as boys. Parents who believe, as many parents do, that is it important for 
their children to become socially acceptable cannot help but require, or at least 
encourage, children to conform to gender, class, race (and so on) expectations, even when 
this has costs in terms of children’s development. 
 34One example is the conflict between encouraging the child’s development (for 
example, encouraging her to explore the world and her own limits by climbing trees) and 
the aim of physical preservation of the child. There is no reason to believe that one can 
always strike a perfect balance between too much and too little protection. For 
illustrations of all the points in this paragraph, see Gheaus, “How do Theories of Care 
Challenge Ideal Theories of Distributive Justice?” 
 35See Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care 
(New York: Routledge, 1993). 




them. The everyday character of these failings does not mean that their 
repercussions are minor. An inability to attend to one’s child’s well-
being and development that is too minor to constitute grounds for remov-
ing the child from parents’ custody can make for distressed children. 
Some of these children may grow into adults lacking in self-confidence, 
curiosity, social skills, purposefulness, and many other traits that influ-
ence how well one’s life goes and one’s ability to make use of opportuni-
ties. 
 Tronto’s account of good care also mentions risks of care that are 
specifically moral. Caregivers can be excessively paternalistic, impeding 
instead of promoting children’s development and autonomy; they can 
display parochialism, that is, pay disproportionate attention to those near 
and dear and not enough to particularly needy strangers; and they can 
neglect their own needs to the extent that they become resentful and 
eventually unable to care. Care shapes us morally, and when it is not 
adequate it lays the ground for moral shortcomings. Particular forms of 
good, as well as bad, care tend to reproduce themselves throughout gen-
erations.36 
 Turning from the ethics of care to the field of developmental psychol-
ogy, the requirements of sufficiently good care appear even more diffi-
cult to meet. According to British child psychologist Donald Winnicott, 
the first psychologist to have looked closely at the standards of suffi-
ciently good care (in fact, he was interested only in sufficiently good 
mothering), the mother figure should be able to meet the child’s needs 
and at the same time allow the necessary amount of frustration, which 
enables the child to develop a sense of being separate from the mother.37 
The mother has to be present and protective, yet without inhibiting the 
child’s development. She has to sometimes fail in promptly meeting the 
dependency needs of the child (such as the needs for food or comfort) in 
order to make possible the child’s separation from her, which is a neces-
sary step in achieving maturity. It seems all too easy to fall short of this 
ideal: too much attention given to the child can be just as bad as too lit-
tle; the same can be said about control, or thinking about the child’s 
needs. In spite of her ambivalent feelings towards her child—which 
Winnicott recognized and theorized—the “good-enough mother” is for-
ever behaving benevolently, and is able to ignore her own needs in order 
to ensure the child’s needs are being optimally met (which, again, can 
involve occasional frustration of the child’s needs). This is indeed a 
highly idealized and unrealistic representation of the good-enough 
                                                          
 36For an account of how moral subjects are being created in the context of caring, see 
also Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), and Hollway, The Capacity to Care. 
 37Here I rely on Parker’s account of Winnicott in Torn in Two. 
 Arguments for Nonparental Care for Children 497 
 
 
mother, as has been argued by feminist psychologists.38 
 In response to Winnicott’s and his followers’ ideal of a mother, new 
theories of good mothering/parenting are being developed that look at the 
realistic implications of the emotional ambivalence in inherent parent-
hood. Love for one’s children motivates parents to make the very taxing 
commitment to raise their children well, and ensures both continuity of 
care and parents’ striving to uphold high standards of care. But parents 
responsible for hands-on care can also at times hate their children even 
while loving them.39 Parker argues that ambivalence in parenting (ex-
perienced by both children and parents) is unavoidable: even the best 
parent will be unable to avoid frustrating her or his child, and even the 
easiest children will put frustrating and boundless demands on their par-
ents. As such, ambivalence need not ruin caring relationships or render 
bad care unavoidable, especially if it is individually and socially ac-
cepted as part of what it means to parent; it does, however, increase the 
likelihood of failures of care. Moreover, ambivalence makes parenting 
particularly difficult, intense, and emotionally costly. I shall return to this 
point later since it constitutes a ground to avoid social isolation in child-
rearing. Nonparental care is beneficial as a particularly reliable (although 
of course not unique) way to avoid social isolation. 
 
 
4. Nonparental Care as a Response to the Risks of Care 
 
In this section, I advance five reasons why some childcare should be 
provided by nonparents, most of which are based on the various ways in 
which parental care can or does fail. Nonparental care mitigates the ef-
fects and spreads the risk of bad care, teaches children how to enter car-
ing relationships with initial strangers, addresses children’s structural 
vulnerability to their caregivers, helps children and parents contain the 
ambivalent feelings of the child-parent relationship, and, finally, redis-
tributes the responsibility for care and the ensuing blame for bad care 
more widely. All arguments look at the well-being of children and/or 
parents. Arguments 4 and 6 are also arguments based on justice—
grounded in children’s needs and fairness to children and, respectively, 
                                                          
 38For example, Parker, Torn in Two, and Hollway, The Capacity to Care. 
 39The experience of strong, ambivalent feelings in the context of parenting is a main 
theme in object-relations theory. See the work of Donald Winnicott and Melanie Klein 
reported in Parker, Torn in Two, and Hollway, The Capacity to Care (see also Parker’s 
extensive analyses of Winnicott and Klein on ambivalence). See also the work of some 
authors on care, such as Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, and (auto)biographies and essays 
about mothering, such as Jeane Lazarre, The Mother Knot (London: Virago, 1976), and 
Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (London: 
Virago, 1977). 




in a duty to prevent unacceptable forms of vulnerability. They hold irre-
spective of whether the costs of childcare should be supported only by 
parents or by the entire society. By contrast, arguments 7 and 8 are issues 
of fairness only if one thinks that the costs of childcare (in this case, non-
material) should be shared by the entire society. 
 All arguments relying on the widespread nature of failed care presup-
pose that while it is possible and desirable to educate people to be better 
parents, the social organization of childcare should be based on the prem-
ise that parents cannot be expected to avoid failures of care. I assume that 
being a sufficiently good parent, like being able to create and sustain 
good relationships with people in general, is not only a matter of acquir-
ing the right knowledge about the other person’s needs, but also a matter 
of having and displaying the right emotions and character traits. Care 
may fail as a result of mistakes in how one thinks children should be 
raised, which are easy to correct through parental training. But care also 
fails as a result of most caregivers’ flaws of character and psychological 
maladjustments, which are much more difficult, if indeed possible at all, 
to correct. There is no reason to believe that parents have either better or 
worse characters or that they are either better or less well adjusted than 
people who are not parents. If so, then the same limitations that apply to 
improving people in general also apply to improving people’s parenting. 
 
(Argument 4) Mitigating the effects of failed care 
 
Abuse and neglect, the most frequent failings of care, range over a very 
wide spectrum, from murder, rape, maiming, and failing to feed children 
and protect their physical integrity, to name-calling, the kind of bullying 
of children that one can observe on the streets every day, or the inability 
to speak to them for prolonged periods. In the worst cases, when children 
suffer neglect or abuse in their homes, regular attendance at institutions 
such as daycare centers, kindergartens, or schools makes the prompt dis-
covery of bad home care more likely. There are, unfortunately, rather 
numerous such cases.40 
 But children who experience much less significant failings of care 
would also benefit from receiving some care from nonparents. Care will 
fail sometimes, no matter who provides it. Examples of such failures in-
clude not being able to pay enough attention to the child’s needs, insuffi-
cient patience, underprotecting or overprotecting the child, projection of 
one’s own fears and needs onto one’s child, and overburdening the child 
with caregivers’ expectations. Caregivers’ flawed relational patterns are 
                                                          
 40According to Adams, in 2002 “[o]n a national level, more than 3 million victims of 
alleged abuse were reported to Child Protective Services in the whole United States” 
(Adams, Jusstice for Children, p.118). 
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likely to be passed on to children.41 And it is extremely unlikely that a 
caregiver can always resist even minor abuses of the enormous power 
over children that they have as adults—particularly since caregivers are 
generally under the strain of meeting competing needs and interests. 
 There is, of course, no reason to believe that nonparental caregivers 
will not make mistakes. But providing a diversity of caregivers for chil-
dren—without depriving them of parents—can, it is to be hoped, mitigate 
the unfortunate consequences of bad care, because different caregivers 
are likely to make different mistakes. For example, a child who is con-
stantly made to feel stupid at home might discover, in the context of in-
stitutional care, that she can be seen as clever. In the same context, how-
ever, she might be made to feel too slow by, say, a caregiver who is un-
able to cope with the pace of this particular child. Experiencing mistakes 
in care that are different from those experienced at home may provide 
children with a very welcome critical distance (either immediately or, at 
least later on, when they develop enough skills to reflect on their own 
upbringing). Exposure to a diversity of caring styles and mistakes puts 
children in a better position to understand what is going on (i.e., flawed 
relational patterns), what is going wrong (i.e., that it is not one’s own 
fault) and perhaps to summon the necessary capacities to minimize the 
damage (starting with the understanding that things can be different). If it 
is true that some of the failures that make for less than adequate care run 
in families and are spontaneously reproduced, then people are likely to 
find it difficult even to be aware of them, and likely instead to perceive 
those harmful patterns of interaction as normal. The most effective way 
to understand that things can be different is actually to experience them 
differently, even if the experience of care by nonparents is itself not free 
of failure. A child who is subjected to too much control at home, for ex-
ample, might only come to understand this while being in the care of a 
non-controlling adult (who, in turn, might be slightly too easygoing). 
While it is possible that parental and nonparental caregivers will make 
the same mistakes, this is not very likely, especially if nonparental care-
givers are trained to identify and rectify the most typical parental mis-
takes. 
 I suggest that we accept the failings of parenting as the expected and 
understandable shortcomings of imperfect human beings, and that we 
acknowledge a duty to mitigate them. An obvious way to do this is by 
organizing society so that children have several caregivers, who, if inevi-
tably imperfect, can at least be expected to have different shortcomings. 
It is probable that professionally trained individuals will be less likely to 
                                                          
 41See Gheaus, “How do Theories of Care Challenge Ideal Theories of Distributive 
Justice?” 




make serious mistakes in care, and will be more likely to notice and cor-
rect the mistakes made by parents; this suggests that nonparental care 
should take place in institutions staffed by professionally trained child-
carers.  
 So far the argument has shown that nonparental care would contribute 
to children’s well-being by meeting their need for sufficiently good care. 
Given the importance of this need, receiving nonparental care may 
amount to a matter of justice if the above conjectures about the wide-
spread nature of failed care are sound. In the absence of enough empiri-
cal research, the question remains, however, whether failed care is as 
widespread as I suggest in this paper. If it is not, universal nonparental 
care can be bad for some children whose parental care is adequate and 
who may be exposed to more bad care overall if they are forced to re-
ceive nonparental care. Let me now address this worry. 
 For those readers who remain unconvinced of the widespread nature 
of failed care, the present argument can be cast as a prioritarian argu-
ment, centered on fairness towards the worst off. For the sake of the ar-
gument, let us assume that some children’s parents are so unlikely to 
make any mistakes that their children would indeed be better off receiv-
ing care exclusively from their parents. With respect to parental care, 
these are the best-off children. By contrast, other children would benefit 
from getting some professional care in institutions, to correct the more or 
less serious failings of care from their parents. These children are worse 
off with respect to parental care than the first group. And a number of 
children, who have particularly bad parents, and who are the worst off 
with respect to parental care, would also benefit from receiving nonpar-
ental childcare, which would make excessively bad parental care more 
easily discoverable.  
 Moreover, suppose that reasons of privacy and the stigma attached to 
being (perceived as) an inadequate parent prevent us from learning who 
are the sufficiently good parents and who are not. The variety and speed 
of change of people’s (including professionals’) ideas of what makes a 
sufficiently good parent give additional grounds for not wanting to pub-
licly label most parents as either “sufficiently good” or “inadequate.” 
With respect to the excessively bad parents, we learn about cases of ex-
treme child neglect or abuse too late to prevent irreversible damage. In 
this case, there is a prioritarian reason to create a mandatory universal 
system that will expose all children to some nonparental care, because 
this would target, and improve, the lives of the worst-off children with 
respect to care. This prioritarian argument is distinct from, but consistent 
with and similar to, the leveling-the-field argument in section 2 above. It 
shows that spreading the risk of bad care through universal nonparental 
care is a matter of fairness to children because it improves the care of the 
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children who are worst off with respect to parental care. 
 To conclude, this is an argument of justice towards children, based on 
the importance of meeting their need for care and on the concern for the 
worst off in terms of parental care. It demands that we minimize the 
harms and spread the risk of failed care through universal nonparental 
care. This care can be provided either at the sole expense of parents or at 
general expense. If it is true that limitations on improving people (as par-
ents) are irremovable, universal nonparental care will be required even in 
economically and gender-fair societies. Hence the relevance of this ar-
gument is wider than that of arguments 1 and 3 above, which presup-
posed a background of either economic or gender unfairness. The follow-
ing two arguments hold, even if everybody would make a sufficiently 
good parent. 
 
(Argument 5) Teaching children how to create caring relationships  
 with initial strangers 
 
Independent of the quality of parental care, spending some time in non-
parental care that is well-designed to cater to their needs can be particu-
larly beneficial for children. In the right setting, nonparental care gives 
children a chance to form intimate and trustful bonds with people who 
are initially strangers to them. This might be the first and critical step in 
developing a sense that they are part of a potentially good and trustwor-
thy world—rather than part of a world sharply divided between benevo-
lent family members and indifferent, or even frightening, strangers. Chil-
dren benefit from having several people to care for them, not least be-
cause an ability to build and maintain caring relationships with people 
who are initially strangers to them is essential throughout their lives. Af-
ter all, most relationships over the course of one’s life are of this kind. 
 Research shows that in care institutions, insecurely attached children 
from ages two to three onwards tend to develop a close relationship with 
a care worker or teacher, which mitigates the effects of the initially inse-
cure attachment.42 And there is some evidence that children in institu-
tional childcare are better at relating to other children. According to a 
study on the effects of daycare on children aged 3.5 to 29 months, the 
significant difference between children raised at home and those who 
attended daycare was the latter’s ability to relate less fearfully with 
peers.43 Therefore it is plausible that adequate nonparental care improves 
                                                          
 42See Ross Thompson, “Early Sociopersonality Development,” in William Damon 
and Nancy Eisenberg (eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume Three: Social, 
Emotional and Personality Development (New York: Wiley, 1998), pp. 25-104. 
 43See Jerome Kagan, Richard B. Kearsley, and Philip R. Zelazo, “The Effects of 
Infant Day Care on Psychological Development,” Evaluation Review 1 (1977): 109-42. See 




general relational abilities. 
 This argument shows that nonparental care can advance children’s 
well-being in a way that is also morally very significant, because it helps 
create a more caring and trustful society. Even if on its own it does not 
make a case for a universal system of nonparental care, this conclusion 
lends important support to such a system. 
 
(Argument 6) Addressing children’s inherent vulnerability 
 
The claim that significant failures of care are the rule rather than the ex-
ception is difficult to prove, not least because it is difficult to trace such 
mistakes without invading people’s privacy. Furthermore, both as chil-
dren and as parents we have strong psychological interests in denying, or 
quickly forgetting, these failures (although at times we become intensely 
aware of them). 
 But there is an argument related to mistakes in care that is independ-
ent of the actual extent of bad care. In a nutshell, the argument is: chil-
dren are highly vulnerable to their caregivers. For this reason, the rela-
tionships between caregivers and children are structurally asymmetrical 
and unequal in power. Such relationships are unacceptable if they in-
volve monopoly. Hence there is a duty to ensure that children have sev-
eral independent caregivers, even if caregivers’ failings were merely pos-
sible, rather than actual. 
 Robert Goodin’s analysis of vulnerability and unacceptable relation-
ships of dependence44 is very relevant to questions regarding duties to-
wards children, although, to the best of my knowledge, he does not apply 
it himself to these issues. It is clear that children are what Goodin calls 
“disjunctively vulnerable” to adults as a group in their need for care, 
which, in theory, they could receive from any adult from a given collec-
tivity. 
 Goodin argues that vulnerability singles out individuals as recipients 
of special obligations: people to whom individuals are vulnerable, either 
individually or collectively, have the obligation to attend to the well-
being of the vulnerable. Vulnerability can be to individual persons, but 
also to groups, and one way of being vulnerable to groups is by being 
vulnerable to any of the members of the group for the needed assistance 
(disjunctive vulnerability). According to Goodin, when someone is vul-
nerable to a group, the respective group has a duty to coordinate efforts 
in order to ensure that the vulnerable individual will be properly treated. 
Thus the organization of care—that is, ensuring that children are ade-
quately cared for, and deciding on standards of care, including the ques-
                                                                                                                                  
also Waldfogel, What Children Need. 
 44See Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable. 
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tion of who has the responsibility to perform which kind of care towards 
children—is a matter of social responsibility. 
 For reasons of efficiency, and because children need continuity in 
care, society assigns the main responsibility for children to particular 
individuals—usually to their natural parents. But it is not acceptable to 
assign the entire responsibility for childcare to single individuals or fami-
lies. If childcare is entirely confined to any particular individual, or even 
to a family of individuals, the relationship between children and their 
caregivers is objectionable. In his analysis of vulnerability as a ground 
for moral obligation, Goodin addresses the question whether vulnerabil-
ity and dependency are in themselves morally objectionable and claims 
that, in many situations, they need not be. Relationships involving vul-
nerability are morally objectionable only if they involve the following 
characteristics: (a) they embody an asymmetrical balance of power; (b) 
the less powerful party vitally needs whatever the other party is supply-
ing; (c) the more powerful party is the only supplier of what the other 
party needs; and (d) the more powerful party has discretionary control 
over those resources.45 Relationships between children and parents fit 
perfectly the first two features of the model: they are asymmetrical rela-
tionships in which parents give vitally needed care to their children. If 
parents are the only source of regular and reliable care for their children, 
then the relationship acquires the third and fourth features, thus making 
it, according to Goodin’s theory, morally unacceptable. 
 Many societies have legislation and child protection institutions that 
allow intervention in the parent-child relationship where parental power 
is abused, thus making sure, in theory, that the fourth condition does not 
apply. However, these precautions are insufficient, since abuses of paren-
tal power are difficult to detect and even more difficult to prevent, as we 
know from the history of physical abuses discovered when the damage 
had already been done. When abuses of power, or the mere inability to 
supply the needed care, are psychological and moral rather than straight-
forwardly physical, they are even more difficult to discover and redress. 
 Note that Goodin’s theory of monopolist dependency relationships 
means that they are wrong even if no abuse takes place. As long as the 
less powerful party (here, children) cannot withdraw from the relation-
ship without severe costs (as, clearly, children cannot), the relationship is 
deemed morally unacceptable.46 
 Providing nonparental care as a regular complement to parental care 
is the least we can do to loosen the parental monopoly on care for each 
child and thus take steps towards containing the high risks of such mo-
                                                          
 45Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 195. 
 46See, in particular, Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, pp. 196-202. 




nopoly. For this solution to work, the nonparental care would have to be 
a robust source of care: reliable, regular, professional, and coming from 
people or institutions that are independent of parents—to ensure that 
should parental care fail, the child can safely turn to the nonparental 
caregiver for help. In practice, this would mean that childcare institutions 
be ready to give children a default, even if temporary, alternative to fam-
ily care.47 
 In many cases of failed parental care, nonparental care will not lead to 
institutionalizing children fully or to placing them in other homes. 
Rather, it will be a source of supplementary care, making children less 
dependent on parental care. A small child whose slow development baf-
fles his family to the point of giving up on him would be treated with the 
necessary patience by properly trained daycare staff—which could not 
happen if the child did not attend daycare. A teenager who does not re-
ceive the guidance she needs at home could turn to the school psycholo-
gist—which she could not do if she were, for example, homeschooled, or 
if schools were strictly academic institutions. Exposure to nonparental 
care would not only mitigate the damages of failed care, but it would also 
render the children’s vulnerability to their caregivers morally more ac-
ceptable. 
 Strictly speaking, this argument suggests that responsibility for chil-
dren should be shared between parents and other people from the mo-
ment of birth. However, if the evidence that children under one year old 
need the continuous presence of one of their parents, and that nonparen-
tal care before age one may be damaging, is sound, there is a strong ar-
gument against universal nonparental care before that age. (Or, at least, 
against institutional nonparental care; other types of nonparental care, 
such as universal and mandatory home visits from childcare workers, 
may be warranted.) 
 This is an argument to the effect that provision of high-quality child-
care should be acknowledged as a matter of common responsibility and 
that even if all parents were able to give sufficiently good care, there 
would still be a duty to expose all children to some nonparental care. 
Since providing nonparental care for all children is the best way of     
addressing the unacceptable vulnerability to a unique source of care,    
we should ensure that all children receive some nonparental care. This   
is a strong argument for understanding nonparental care as a matter       
of justice, based on the duty to protect children from unacceptable vul-
                                                          
 47According to a recent article in the New York Times (Ian Urbina, “For Runaways, 
Sex Buys Survival,” 27 October 2009), there are 1.6 million runaway children each year 
in the United States, many of whom never return to their families but end up in the 
underworld of drugs and prostitution. While there is some institutional space for 
accommodating these children, it is not sufficient and not offered as a default option. 
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nerabilities, and thus for introducing compulsory universal nonparental 
care. 
 
(Argument 7) Containing the ambivalent emotions of parenting 
 
The next argument is grounded in the well-being of both parents and 
children, and starts from the assumption that ambivalence is a constant of 
the intimate relationship between parents and children.48 There is a vast 
feminist literature that analyzes the harms of over-idealized representa-
tions of mothers as having entirely loving feelings for their children;49 
arguably the same applies to over-idealized representations of parent-
hood. Ambivalent feelings towards one’s child are particularly difficult 
for parents who raise their children in relative social isolation and who 
bear the responsibility of hands-on caring for them alone. The social iso-
lation of a parent continuously caring for her child increases the intensity 
of parenting and exacerbates maternal/parental ambivalence.50 Nonparen-
tal care is one reliable way to break this continuity periodically and 
safely and to give parents the necessary parenting-free time. 
 Once ambivalence and the danger of social isolation are recognized, it 
may be easier to acknowledge the importance of sharing the intense work 
of childcare between several people.51 Although inevitable, the intensity 
resulting from parents’ and children’s ambivalence can be made more 
bearable, and less harmful, if parental childcare is periodically inter-
rupted by nonparental care. Sharing with other caregivers the burden of 
being seen at times as horrible can be beneficial for parents and actually 
promote better parenting. The mutually aggressive emotions that are part 
of the relationships between parents and children are more likely to be 
kept in check and managed if the bond of care is not exclusive, but 
alongside the parent there are other—ideally committed and fairly con-
tinuous—caregivers. Thus some nonparental care would advance the 
well-being of both children and parents because it would mitigate the 
                                                          
 48In psychological theory informed by clinical practice, this was first theorized by 
Winnicott and Klein. For recent work on parental ambivalence see also Parker, Torn in 
Two, and Wendy Hollway and Brid Featherstone (eds.), Mothering and Ambivalence 
(New York: Routledge, 1997). 
 49See Benjamin, The Bonds of Love; Ruddick, Maternal Thinking; Parker, Torn in 
Two. 
 50Parker’s work abounds in examples of mothers who, being the only continuous 
caregivers of their children, struggle not only with the frustration of experiencing 
ambivalence, but also with the fear of acting on their aggressive feelings.  
 51Benjamin argues that the sentimental idealization of motherhood and denial of 
motherly ambivalence impedes change in the provision of better day care, medical care, 
maternity leave, and flextime in the workplace, which are so necessary for real, imperfect 
mothers and unnecessary for the ideal, omnipotent ones (Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, p. 
211). 




extent and consequences of ambivalence. 
 This argument, as well as the following, are similar in structure to the 
second argument discussed in section 2, namely, that we should advance 
parents’ well-being by organizing childcare such that parents share with 
others some of the (material and nonmaterial) costs of rearing children. If 
ambivalence—with the intense, and sometimes aggressive, emotions it 
entails—is a burden, then mitigating parental ambivalence is also good 
for children. Parents might still be the ones most emotionally involved, 
for better or worse, with their children. But if other people regularly take 
on some of the work and responsibility of caring for children, parenthood 
does not have to be the disproportionately resource-demanding activity it 
is if undertaken by parents alone. 
 Whether this is also a matter of fairness to parents is more controver-
sial. As more generally in this paper, I do not take into consideration the 
benefits of parenthood. Some readers will think that once we take these 
benefits into account, we shall find it is only fair that parents shoulder 
alone the entire burden of having children. They will resist the conclu-
sion that alleviating the burdens of the no-exit commitment—in the form 
it takes in Alstott’s argument that I presented above, and in arguments 7 
and 8—is a matter of fairness to parents. But they will not resist the con-
clusion that alleviating the burdens of ambivalence (and, in the next ar-
gument, of blame) is beneficial and that nonparental care—at parents’ 
expense—is an obvious solution, given the various benefits it has for 
children. Moreover, if the burdens of children’s own ambivalence and 
resentment (see below) about bad care are indeed both inevitable and 
serious realities that nonparental care could alleviate, there may be a case 
of fairness towards children in favor of universal nonparental care 
(whether at parents’ or at everybody’s expense). This would of course 
require a significant amount of empirical support and additional argu-
ment. 
 
(Argument 8) Redistributing the blame for bad care 
 
In addition to the harm it inflicts on children, and the guilt it inflicts on 
parents, failed care entails long-lasting blame. Because the care one re-
ceives early in life shapes one’s personality, character, and long-term 
prospects, people can harbor deep resentment against their caregivers for 
their failings and mistakes. 
 Blame against mothers is widespread across different societies, and is 
present in cultural representations, such as folklore and everyday humor, 
in medical and psychological theory and practice, and in legal practice.52 
                                                          
 52For blame against mothers in everyday circumstances, see Molly Ladd-Taylor and 
Lauri Umansky (eds.), “Bad” Mothers: The Politics of Blame in Twentieth-Century 
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Blame against parents is present to a much lesser extent—unsurprisingly, 
since until very recently it was mothers who provided the vast majority 
of hands-on caring for children. It is tempting to speculate that as moth-
ers and fathers start to share hands-on care for their children more 
equally, mother-blaming is being replaced by parent-blaming. Much of 
the existing blame is sexist, and undoubtedly much of it is misguided—
for example, we now know that conditions such as autism and schizo-
phrenia, once blamed on inadequate mothering, have different causes. 
 Suppose that the kind of misguided blame present in these examples 
were entirely eliminated and we could correctly identify the unhappy 
consequences of failed care. Then it would be fair to blame some such 
failures—for instance, intentional and conscious cruelty—on parents. It 
would be less fair to blame them for other failures—such as, perhaps, 
unintentional, unconscious cruelty.53 But whether excusable or not, both 
kinds of failings might have the same impact in terms of the children’s 
well-being and development. There is an understandable tendency for 
individuals to hold their parents partially accountable for their own 
shortcomings, whatever their causal history. If it is true that primary 
caregivers shape to a large extent our personalities and characters, it is 
hard to see how even the undeserved, or less deserved, blame for failed 
care can be entirely eschewed. 
 It is not only children who are angry about the (perceived) failings of 
care, but also, sometimes, third parties. Spouses for example are often 
resentful at what they perceive to be failings in the upbringing of their 
partners, and so are grandchildren or close friends if they attribute sys-
tematic relational difficulties to past bad care. Such blame outlives not 
only bad care and its harms, but sometimes even the caring relationships 
themselves, which often collapse under its pressure. 
 If mistakes are endemic to care, and if they result in blame that erodes 
some of the most important relationships, it does not seem beneficial that 
caregiving be socially organized such that all blame is inevitably placed 
                                                                                                                                  
America (New York: New York University Press, 1998). For the systematic way in 
which psychiatrists, psychologists, and counselors blame mothers for a wide variety of 
their children’s problems, from social and educational inadequacies to different 
functionings such as autism to mental troubles such as schizophrenia, see Paula Caplan 
and Ian Hall-McCorquodale, “Mother-Blaming in Major Clinical Journals,” American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 55 (1985): 345-53; and Paula Caplan and Ian Hall-
McCorquodale, “The Scapegoating of Mothers: A Call for Change,” American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 55 (1985): 610-13. 
 53Especially since collective understandings of what counts as cruel vary. Where I 
grew up, children have regularly witnessed much animal suffering, without there being, 
either amongst the adults or the children, a sense that this was cruel and that children 
should have been sheltered from this. Exposing children to such amounts of animal 
suffering would be considered cruel today in most Western countries. 




on parents. An organization of childcare that systematically results in 
blame being put only on parents is possibly also unfair, at least to those 
children who feel particularly acute resentment due to very bad care. A 
better arrangement would involve parents sharing with others the risk of 
giving bad care and the resulting blame. 
 If nonparents did some of the work of care, at either parents’ or soci-
ety’s expense, they would share with parents the responsibility for its 
inevitable failings, which might also help to diminish the overall amount 
of blame in two ways. First, if nonparents provided some of the child-
care, then the impact of mistakes and other failings of care would be less 
damaging (cf. argument 4) and thus the blame placed on parents would 
be diminished. Second, if several people care for us while we are chil-
dren, and if this gives us a better chance of understanding their mistakes 
as human and to be expected, then we might be better able to resist blam-
ing our caregivers (parental or not) for those types of failure, which are 
unintentional, unconscious, and common to most human beings. 
 Given the importance for children to have at least one parent in one’s 
life, it is unrealistic to believe that we could, or should, try fully to share 
childcare, together with its endemic mistakes and the ensuing blame be-
tween parents and nonparents. And, given the intensity and strength of 
the bond between mothers and children, who start out as nondifferenti-
ated bodily and psychical entities, it may be unrealistic to believe that we 
could, or should try to, write gender out of the distribution of very early 
childcare (and its unavoidable tribulations). The real choice is between 
allowing parents to do all the childcare and sharing some of it between 





I have presented several existing arguments on the value of nonparental 
care. I then offered five more arguments, based on the observation of 
how difficult it is to give sufficiently good care, that we should ensure 
that all children are exposed to some nonparental care. Taken together, 
the arguments discussed here show that a social organization of care that 
exposes all children to some nonparental care in adequate settings would 
advance children’s and parents’ well-being, would be fair to children and 
possibly to parents as well, and is called for by a duty to protect children 
from unacceptable vulnerabilities. I have implicitly argued against the 
legitimacy of all types of childrearing—such as, for example, home-
schooling—that tend to prevent children from creating enduring and ro-
bust care relationships with adults outside the households where they 
grow up. In particular, the arguments based on fairness towards children 
and on the duty to protect them from unacceptable forms of dependence 
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lead to the conclusion that nonparental care should be universal. 
 Several of the arguments concerning failed care might equally support 
the conclusion that sharing the work between two parents is better than 
having all or most of it provided by only one parent, and that having 
more family members involved in childrearing is better than confining all 
childcare to the nuclear family. 
 Arrangements for nonparental care are already in place in many so-
cieties, but this is not the case everywhere in the world, and these ar-
rangements are not as strongly normative as they should be. Most impor-
tantly, because it is not universal, existing nonparental care might be ex-
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